Margaret Chatterjee on Indian Metaphysics – contemporary contributions and commitment to pluralisms.

In an already somewhat older publication (1993), Margaret Chatterjee explores “Indian Metaphysics” (‘Indian Metaphysics’, in Contemporary Philosophy. A New Survey. Vol. 7, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 83-105). She discusses the distinctions between metaphysics and speculative, descriptive and revisionary metaphysics, phenomenological and ontological in the light of contemporary Indian philosophy. She begins with the usual problem faced by contemporary Indian philosophers, oscillating between a commitment to Indian traditions and a necessity to discuss these contemporary debates and denominations – or to discuss the traditions in contemporary debates and denominations. What does it mean to be an Indian metaphysician today?

“In fact there had traditionally been three levers in Indian philosophical thought – experiential warrant, “authority”, and logic. In the past, considerable dexterity was shown in weaving a web in which these very diverse threads might very well pull in contrary ways. Modern thinking is characteristic in no longer sensing an obligation to juggle with all three. Crises of conscience are felt most by those who still feel such an obligation and yet wish to evidence an awareness of what is de rigueur on the world philosophical scene. Those who would regard it as a compliment to be called metaphysicians often look at a classical thinker through the spectacles of a modern one (cf. looking at Shankara through the eyes of Husserl) or proceed in the opposite direction, i.e. looking at Husserl through the eyes of Shankara. Such procedures can give rise to innovative scholarly approaches (not always genuinely ‘comparative’) but tend to inhibit original work. The tendency to write footnotes to a major thinker is perhaps a common phenomenon today, regardless of which country we may live in.” (p.84)

So, how do we avoid appending footnotes to Husserl and Shankara? Who can be said to have developed original work per se in metaphysics, and beyond the ‘who’ (Chatterjee does not pretend at any exhaustivity in her article), ‘why’ and ‘how’ are they original? Is there a common specificity in doing metaphysics in India ‘today’?

Chatterjee suggests three names belonging to the “post-K.C. Bhattacharyya” area and develops three philosophical journeys: the one of Jehangir N. Chubb (1910-?), the one of Kalidas Bhattacharyya (1911-1984), and the one of Nikunja Vihari Banerjee (1897-1982). Her analysis of their work and of the problem of defining metaphysics today is worthwhile reading in details. I only want to highlight here a few stimulating conclusions we can draw from it.

In general, she orientates her analysis as follows:

“Several modern Indian metaphysical thinkers find entry to a metabasis eis allo genos within stances of reflection. Such reflective shifts seem to me to take the place of the classical distinction between the paramārthika and the vyavahārika. To the phenomenologically inclined they take the place of the turn from the naturalistic standpoint to the post-epoché stance of ratio intuitive. However, it is usually maintained that a purged mode of reflection, that is, one which has left behind the unreflective, can provide insight into the nature of what is. But since these insights are so various, philosophers like K. K. Banerjee and Kalidas Bhattacharyya concede how diverse our standpoints can be. Herein lies both their modesty and, I would say, their realism.” p. 85 (emphasis are mine)

Jehangir N. Chubb, Kalidas Bhattacharyya and Nikunja Vihari Banerjee develop followingly different ways of articulating viewpoints, standpoints and philosophical positions. Thus, I believe, their metaphysics are grounded in a commitment to articulate pluralism, in the different forms of pluralism itself. I would like to suggest, following her analysis, that what may connect this post-KCB generation of Anglophone Indian philosophers in Academics (and the ones after them?), notwithstanding of the differences of their references and trainings, is a strong methodological commitment to develop alternative ways of thinking philosophy/metaphysics from different viewpoints. In other words: a commitment to reconciliate philosophical positions that appear irreconcilable. This is not in itself a work in comparative philosophy, since it does not compare authors or works, but creates metaphysical ‘systems’ or reflections to accommodate pluralism, although it is comparative in nature. Thus, it avoids the ‘footnote’ effect, since it does not remain committed to specific authors. Chatterjee’s analysis is already a dense summary of each of these thinkers position, and I can’t do justice to them or to her in trying here to resume how they effectuate this sense of pluralism, but I can try to give a sense of their project.

Chubb invokes “Critical Philosophy” that involves an awareness of “the origin of our thought, i.e. the points of orientation and on what they rest” (Chubb, in Chatterjee, p.86). Developing further these predicaments into a (self-)critical philosophy attitude implies a contemplation or witnessing thought on philosophy itself. This insight becomes metaphysically relevant:

“Metaphysics centres round the concept of the Infinite as the “self-existent self-luminous course of all that exists” (…) The bearing that the mode of consciousness has on a particular concept is brought out in his comment that the concept of God is “impregnated with its characteristic mode of experience”. Apart from the point that there is no one characteristic mode of religious experience, which could be mentioned in criticism, it must be noted that Chubb is saying something important here regarding the relation of concepts and experiences. In the sphere of religious consciousness concepts are neither instruments which penetrate, not nets which seek to capture, but rather ideas which bear the mark of the experience that gives them birth. We have obviously moved away from concepts which enable or which serve in a regulative manner (Kant’s two kinds) to concepts which are necessarily imbued in a certain manner. This certainly throws some light on perhaps a leading characteristic of authentic religious discourse.” p.89

Regarding Kalidas Bhattacharyya, his metaphysical way of reconciliating and accommodating viewpoints is quite famous, developed in his concept of alternation after his father. To summarize with Chatterjee:

“Bhattacharyya’s first published work, Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy, presented his “logic of alternation”, showing how philosophy inevitably presents alternatives no one of which is theoretically stronger than another. We can detect in this echoes both of Kant’s treatment of antinomies of reason and of the Jaina insistence on plurality of viewpoint. But it provides a dauting initial insight, admitting as it does that whatever a particular philosopher might maintain there will always be others who quite legitimately will maintain something very different. I believe this starting point of his derives both from logical considerations and from his father’s frequent references to indetermination. Whether this indetermination was ontological or whether it was based on human cognitive failings remained to the end a baffling problem for him.”p.92

“Unlike the two philosophers already discussed”, Nikunja Vihari Banerjee “was not troubled by the diversity of philosophical viewpoints.” p.96, says Chatterjee. Yet, he fought another but related battle: to reintegrate the plurality of selves at a metaphysical level in the complex heritage of the idea of ‘liberation’ from the Indian traditions. This commitment connects him to the previous endeavor, less in terms of internal philosophical construction – how to accommodate different metaphysical standpoints that possibly contradict each other into one metaphysical account? – but rather, how to make metaphysics embedded in the plurality of selves? Thus, the answer in Chatterjee’s terms:

“Language, Meaning and Persons sets the stage for Banerjee’s most original contribution to metaphysics, his view that selves are “essential to one another”. Our intelligence, he says, has been bewitched not by language but by the belief that men are mere individuals. This is not ignorance simpliciter if ignorance be taken to be a cognitive deprivation. The bewitchment comes out of the gulf between knowledge and performance which pertains to our ordinary actions (the vyavahārika level, if you like, except for Banerjee I suspect there is no meaning in speaking of a paramārthika level). Human activity can be understood either as ‘knowledge-with-a-view-to performance, which he calls ‘Imagination’, or ‘performance-with-a-view-to knowledge’, which he calls ‘Understanding’. In addition we have the human passions which are possessed of power of a blind and reckless kind and with which Understanding is often allied.” p.98

The details of Chatterjee’s analysis into these philosophers reveal how, in a fascinating and rigorous manner, each of them succeeded in developing philosophically or metaphysically reflections and concepts to think plurality inside philosophy itself. Couldn’t it be a way to approach this period of Anglophone Indian Philosophy?